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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 980101-CA 
v. : 
CHAD STATEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute in a drug-free zone, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (1996). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1997) 
(pourover from the Utah Supreme Court; see letter from the Clerk, Utah Supreme 
Court, dated 13 February 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly allow admission of methamphetamine seized 
from defendant's day planner since it was found during a search incident to his 
arrest and the planner was within his immediate control? "The factual findings of a 
trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. . . . The trial court's 'legal conclusions 
are reviewed for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts.'" State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 388 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citations omitted). 
A trial court's ruling on probable cause to make a warrantless arrest is not 
reversed on appeal "unless it clearly appears that [the trial court] was in error." State 
v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
2 
the person or thing to be seized.1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 (1980): 
An arrest is an actual restraint of the person arrested or submission 
to custody. The person shall not be subjected to any more restraint than is 
necessary for his arrest and detention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (1986): 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or 
may, without warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence 
of any peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical 
sense, or records the observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has 
committed it; 
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has 
committed a public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing 
the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the 
commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property 
belonging to another person. 
Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i): 
With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a 
defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty . . . reserving in the 
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails 
on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea. 
1
 Defendant has not asserted or briefed a separate state constitutional claim. 
Hence, any state constitutional argument should be deemed waived. State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 660-661 (Utah 1985). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with two counts of distribution of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine and marijuana) in a drug-free zone, first degree felonies, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iv) (1996), possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37A-5(a) (1996), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (1996) 
(R. l,6-7).2 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his motel room in 
connection with his arrest (R. 22-23). The State filed a written response (R. 40-45), 
to which defendant replied (R. 50-63). After a hearing (R. 47-48, 144-190), the trial 
court granted defendant's suppression motion in part and denied it in part (R. 66-74).3 
The trial court suppressed several videotape cassettes from which the tape had been 
removed, a pager, and a cellular telephone because it could not be determined that they 
were seized in an area within defendant's immediate control (R. 67-68). The trial court 
refused to suppress a pistol-grip 12-gauge shotgun and shells, a butane torch and 
attachments, cans of butane, two sets of scales, empty baggies, and a folding ice 
scraper and day planner both of which contained baggies of marijuana and 
2
 Pages in the two "pleadings folders" are numbered sequentially back to front. 
3
 The trial court's ruling (R. 66-74) is in the addendum. 
4 
methamphetamine. IcL 
Following the partial denial of his pretrial suppression motion, defendant pled 
guilty to possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug-free zone 
with intent to distribute, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(l)(a)(iv) (1996), and to possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(l)(a) (1996). 
Defendant entered his plea on condition that he could appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress (R. 75-89; see Utah R. Crim. P. ll(i); State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah App. 1988)). The trial court accepted defendant's conditional plea and sentenced 
him to five-years-to-life in prison and a $10,000.00 fine on the distribution charge, and 
-zero-to-five years in prison and a $5,000.00 fine on the weapons charge (R. 90-91). 
Defendant's sentence was suspended, and he was placed on 36-months probation. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 96-99). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although he provides his own statement of facts in his brief (Def. Br. at 4-8), 
defendant does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. 
The same judge presided at the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing 
(R. 74), and he relied on evidence from both hearings in making factual findings in 
support of his ruling. IcL The trial court's detailed findings of fact (with supporting 
citations from the record) follow: 
5 
On December 22, 1996, officers in Provo, Utah were trying to 
locate Megan Kearley, a sixteen-year-old runaway. Officers received 
information that Megan might be at the Motel 6 in Provo on South 
University Avenue, and that she was thought to be staying with a male 
individual by the first name of Chad.4 The officer went to the front desk 
of the Motel 6 and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at the front 
desk. A teller or manager at the front desk indicated that they did have a 
young female fitting the description staying in a room (208 in the 
preliminary hearing [R. 114]; 263 in the suppression hearing [R. 162]) 
that was rented to a "Chad Staten." They gave the officers the driver's 
license number which was used as identification to rent the room. 
Dispatch confirmed the license number as Chad Staten's. The person at 
the front desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to the 
room from somewhere else a few minutes before.5 
The officer then went across the street and called the room 
registered to Chad Staten and asked for Megan. The male individual who 
answered the phone said that Megan was not there but should be back 
soon. The male attempted to get the officer to give his name, and then 
there was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very 
important that he get in touch with Megan. The male indicated that he 
thought he knew what the officer needed and that he might be able to help 
him. The officer then asked the defendant if he had some "stuff" to 
which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer 
needed and that the officer should call back in ten minutes.6 Officer 
Heniger7 testified [that he thought defendant would be responsive to his 
question about "stuff" because "defendant had mentioned something about 
[Megan's] pager number" (R. 164; cf, R. 147); he also testified] that kids 
4R. 113, 159-160. 
5R. 114, 161-162. 
6R. 115-116, 162-164. 
7
 Based on documents in the record, the officer's name is "Heninger" (see R. 1, 
36, 49). The trial court misspells it as "Heniger" throughout. Defendant likewise 
misspells it as "Henigar" throughout his brief (see, e ^ , Def. Br. at 4). 
6 
that have pagers that (the police) deal with usually have some ties with 
drugs.8 
The officer then began calling the narcotics officers for back-up. 
Before the other officers arrived, a vehicle drove into the parking lot and 
a female fitting Megan's description got out of the vehicle and went into 
room 263.9 After waiting a few more minutes, Officer Heniger called 
room 263 again and talked to Megan. She said that he should talk to 
"Chad" and handed the phone to him. Defendant told the officer that he 
could get him some "bitch." Officer Heniger testified that "bitch" is a 
street name for methamphetamine. The officer told defendant he would 
be right over. Megan was then observed leaving room 263 and entering a 
vehicle. She was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway, and she 
was taken into custody.10 
Megan had in her possession a small zip-lock baggie of rock 
methamphetamine. She said that she had gotten it from the defendant in 
the motel room ["for a guy who wanted it" (R. 168)]. When Megan was 
placed in custody she requested to be able to go up to the room where the 
defendant was, and on the terrace, balcony level of the second level she 
began to scream about two doors from the defendant's room. She 
continued to scream as the officers then took her back down the stairs and 
secured her. Officer Heniger believed the defendant could hear the 
screaming, and Megan was attempting to alert and warn the defendant that 
there was a problem.11 
Next, the officer asked a friend of Megan's, Tim Hansen, to go 
with him to room 263. Officer Heniger explained his reason for taking a 
civilian appearance as follows: 
The exact reason if he (Staten) saw a uniformed officer and 
he had already offered me narcotics over the phone and if he 
saw a uniformed officer he doesn't have to open up the 
door. He could just go and flush everything down the toilet. 
8
 R. 164. 
9R. 114, 164-165. 
10
 R. 114-115, 165-167. 
11
 R. 115, 151, 167-170. 
7 
(Transcript, Suppression Hearing at 27 [R. 170]). 
The officer was to the side where he could not be seen as the 
defendant opened the door. Once the door was opened, the officer 
stepped out facing the defendant. From this position outside the door, the 
officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and several boxes that said 
"scales" on them. The baggies were similar to the ones that the 
methamphetamine was in that was found on Megan's person. Tim 
Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said, "Look, there is a marijuana 
pipe." Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe, and when the officer 
asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, the defendant agreed. 
The defendant denied the officer's request to search the premises; he 
would not let them search without a warrant.12 
The officer, from the doorway, and when he entered the room, was 
able to observe several items of paraphernalia in plain view; the copper 
butane nozzle which both he and the civilian thought looked like a 
marijuana pipe, baggies and a box marked "scales." The baggies were 
identical to the one produced by Megan; very small, an inch by inch 
baggie with a little zip-lock on top. When the officer retrieved the item 
which was actually copper tubing attached to a blow torch, he also noticed 
several butane torches and several butane tanks underneath the same 
nightstand/desk area.13 
Defendant was then "taken into custody" in the room and 
handcuffed and asked to be seated in a chair near the foot of one of the 
beds. At this point Officer Heniger was the only officer in the room. 
Officer Heniger then made a very cursory search for weapons.14 
A loaded, pistol grip, shotgun without a stock, was recovered 
within a few feet of the front door and within "lunge area" of the 
defendant. The weapon was secured [by the officer].15 
The facts now are muddled, but what is clear is that the officer 
waited about fifteen minutes for NET (Narcotics Enforcement Team) 
12




 R. 118, 173, 175. 
15
 R. 130, 180-182. 
8 
officers to arrive. NET officers "inventoried"16 the items in the room, 
finding several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, digital scales and 
additional shotgun shells.17 
A NET officer asked the defendant for identification. The 
defendant said identification was in the planner. A planner had been 
recovered tucked between the mattresses one-half way between the 
headboard and the foot of the bed. The officer opened the planner to 
obtain the ID and located baggies of drugs and a set of small scales.18 
There were no third persons in the motel room until Chad Staten 
was arrested.19 But there was no testimony whether a bathroom was 
separate from the sleeping room. 
It is important to note that Officer Heniger is a new officer, with 
two years of experience. In addition, it is important to note that he is a 
patrolman.20 Next, it is important to note that the Motel 6 room is small, 
consisting of two beds, and the nightstand was about ten feet from the 
front door.21 
(R. 70-73; underline in original). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant does not challenge the lawfulness of his warrantless arrest. The trial 
court correctly concluded that the officer properly seized defendant's planner incident 
to his lawful arrest since it was "within four feet" of defendant and thus within his 
immediate control. Since the trial judge did not base his ruling to allow admission on 
16
 See p. 13, below. 
17
 R. 118-120, 122, 129-141, 173-180. 
18
 R. 119, 123, 130, 178. 
19
 R. 117, 149, 153-156, 162-163, 165-166, 171, 175, 180. 
20
 R. 112-113, 158-159. 
21
 R. 116, 157, 171. 
9 
exigent circumstances, a discussion of that exception to the warrant requirement is 
unnecessary. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED ADMISSION OF 
DRUGS FOUND IN DEFENDANT'S DAY PLANNER SINCE THEY 
WERE SEIZED DURING A SEARCH INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST 
Defendant does not contest the trial court's factual findings, nor challenge the 
lawfulness of his warrantless arrest.22 Instead, defendant argues that the search of his 
motel room was not justified by exigent circumstances (Def. Br. at 11-13), or, in the 
alternative, that his planner was not properly seized incident to his arrest since it was 
not within his immediate control (Def. Br. at 13-16). While defendant alludes to "two 
Defendant's decision not to challenge his warrantless arrest is understandable. 
When the officer first approached defendant's motel room, he had probable cause to 
make a warrantless arrest for any one of three reasons: (1) defendant had just 
committed a felony in the officer's "presence" by offering on the telephone to sell him 
methamphetamine (R. 114-116, 162-167; see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) 
(1996)); (2) the officer had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had just 
committed a felony by providing the methamphetamine that Megan was going to give to 
a man in a car when the officer arrested her (R. 114-115, 165-168; see Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (1996)); and (3) the officer had reasonable cause to believe that 
defendant had been alerted by Megan's screaming as they approached his room and 
might destroy or conceal evidence (R. 115, 151, 167-170). Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
(1986); cf, R. 70. After defendant opened the door, the officer also had probable cause 
to arrest him when the officer saw a butane torch with attachments, empty one-inch-by-
one-inch ziplock baggies matching the baggie containing methamphetamine seized from 
Megan, and a box labeled "Scales," all in plain view (R. 116-118, 122-124, 171-173, 
178; see Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5(a) (1996); cf R. 70). 
10 
searches" (Def. Br. 8-16), his argument only actually addresses what he terms the 
"second search" (Def. Br. at 10-16). In fact, although officers seized other 
incriminating evidence from his motel room which the trial court ruled admissible (see 
R. 67-68), defendant now contests only the admissibility of five zip-lock baggies of 
methamphetamine found in his planner (Def. Br. at 13-16).23 
Although he found that exigent circumstances may initially have justified a 
warrantless search of defendant's motel room (see R. 69-70), the trial court ultimately 
concluded that the search yielding defendant's planner was justified because it was 
incident to defendant's lawful arrest (R. 66-70; see especially R. 67, item number 7). 
A discussion of exigent circumstances is therefore unnecessary here.24 The trial court 
correctly concluded that the officer properly seized defendant's planner incident to his 
lawful arrest since it was "within four feet" of defendant and thus within his immediate 
control (R. 68). 
"It is well settled that a 'lawful custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies 
the contemporaneous search without warrant of the person arrested and of the 
immediately surrounding area.'" State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App. 
23
 Also found in defendant's planner was a set of hand scales (R. 119, 122-123, 
177-179, 187). 
24
 Although exigent circumstances were not the basis of the trial court's ruling, 
this Court may affirm on any proper ground. State v. Elder. 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 
(Utah App. 1991). 
11 
1996) (quoting Chimel v. California, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040 (1969)), cert, denied, 916 
P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). The United States Supreme Court has held that such searches 
may be conducted "whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the person 
arrested may have a weapon or is about to destroy evidence." United States v. 
Chadwick, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2485 (1977), overruled on other grounds in California v. 
Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. 1982 (1991). The high court's rationale is that "[t]he potential 
dangers lurking in all custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 
'immediate control' area reasonable without requiring the arresting officer to calculate 
the probability that weapons or destructible evidence may be involved." ta^ 
In construing the area of "immediate control," this Court has held that "doubt 
about the arrestee's ability to access weapons or evidence in a particular area because 
of distance, or police restraint, does not prohibit police from properly searching the 
area." Moreno, 910 P.2d at 1247. 
Utah Supreme Court precedent supports this principle. In State v. Austin, 584 
P.2d 853 (Utah 1978), the closest case to the facts here, the supreme court upheld the 
search of Austin's hotel room as incident to his arrest even though he had been 
handcuffed before the search. The court held that the search was valid since it was 
"restricted to a single room where [Austin] was arrested and held in custody" and he 
"was present during the search." Austin, 584 P.2d at 856. In a more recent case, this 
Court declined to uphold a search where it was not established that the search was 
12 
conducted in the same room where the defendant was arrested or while he was present. 
See State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386, 390-391 (Utah App. 1996).25 
Utah appellate courts have upheld searches as incident to arrest even where the 
arrestee was handcuffed or under guard, or separated from the area or thing searched. 
See Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247 (holding that a search of Moreno's car while he was 
handcuffed and seated in a patrol car was a valid search incident to his arrest), cert, 
denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996); State v. Harrison. 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.) 
(holding that the search of a diaper bag while Mrs. Harrison was prone and guarded ten 
feet away and while Mr. Harrison was handcuffed and being driven away in a patrol 
car was a valid search incident to their arrests), cert, denied. 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 
1991); State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65, 78-79 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a search of 
the bedroom where Webb was arrested and handcuffed, and the search of his 
codefendant's purse in the room where she was arrested, handcuffed, and made to 
kneel on the floor, were valid searches incident to their arrests); State v. Kent. 665 
P.2d 1317, 1318-1319 (Utah 1983) (holding that a search of Kent's car while he was 
handcuffed and required to lie on the ground was a valid search incident to his arrest). 
5
 As already noted, the trial court in defendant's case likewise suppressed 
several items of evidence because it could not determine that they were found in the 
room where defendant was arrested (see R. 67-68). 
13 
Controlling federal and state authority also holds that searches incident to arrest 
may include "the contents of any containers found" within the immediate control of the 
arrestee. See New York v. Belton. 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 (1981); accord Harrison, 805 
P.2d at 784 (diaper bag); Webb. 790 P.2d at 78-79 (purse). "Container," in this 
context, means "any object capable of holding another object" whether opened or 
closed. Belton, 110 S.Ct. n.4 at 2864; see also United States v. Burnette. 698 F.2d 
1038, 1049 (9th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert, denied. 103 S.Ct. 2106 (1983) (holding 
that containers found within the area into which the arrestee might reach to retrieve a 
weapon or destroy evidence may be searched contemporaneously with the arrest); 
Baxter v. State. 274 Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935 (1982) (holding that a search incident 
to arrest requires no additional justification, and that a search of containers, whether 
open or closed, may be conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest), cert, denied. 102 S.Ct. 
2930 (1982). 
These cases justify the search here. The search yielding defendant's planner 
took place in the same room where he was arrested and within four feet of where he 
was seated (R. 68; see R. 157); see Webb. 790 P.2d at 78-79; Austin. 584 P.2d at -; 
cf. Wells. 928 P.2d at 390-391. The search was conducted by a single officer who was 
looking for weapons after handcuffing defendant and waiting for other officers to arrive 
(R. 70-71; see R. 173, 180; but see R. 177-178); see Moreno. 910 P.2d at 1247; 
Harrison. 805 P.2d at 784; Webb. 790 P.2d at 78-79; Kent, 665 P.2d at 1318-1319; cf 
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Wells. 928 P.2d at 390-391. After finding a loaded shotgun near the door, the officer 
found defendant's planner "tucked between the mattresses one-half way between the 
headboard and the foot of the bed" (R. 71; see R. 119, 180-182). Within fifteen 
minutes, a narcotics officer arrived and asked defendant for identification (R. 71; see 
R. 130). Defendant said that it was in his planner. IdL The narcotics officer opened 
defendant's planner which was then on the bed and discovered, among other things, 
five baggies containing methamphetamine. Id (see R. 133-134); see Be]ton, 101 S.Ct. 
at 2864; Harrison. 805 P.2d at 784; Webb. 790 P.2d at 78-79; see also Burnette, 698 
F.2d at 1049; Baxter. 626 S.W.2d at 935. 
In sum, the trial court properly upheld the search challenged here as a valid 
search incident to defendant's lawful arrest. 
Alternatively. This Search Can Be Upheld Because An Inventory Search Would 
Have Led To The Inevitable Discovery Of The Planner and Methamphetamine. 
Although the trial court did not rely on this basis, this Court could affirm on alternative 
grounds: that an inventory search would have led to the inevitable discovery of 
defendant's planner and the methamphetamine it contained. See Elder. 815 P.2d 1344 
n.4. 
When the narcotics officer advised the Motel 6 management that defendant was 
under arrest and asked what they would like to be done with the room, they asked him 
to take all of defendant's property wrap it in a bed sheet, tie it up securely, and bring it 
is 
to the office so they could retain it until defendant returned to claim it (R. 129, 137, 
139, 141, 173-174). This was pursuant to an established procedure the motel had 
arranged with police (R. 173-174), and one of the officers completed a property report 
during the inventory (R. 131; Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2). 
In South Dakota v. Opperman. 96 S.Ct. 3092, 2096-3100 (1976), the United 
States Supreme Court held that inventory searches of automobiles were proper in order 
to protect the owner's property, insure against claims of lost or stolen property, and 
protect police from danger. Accord State v. Johnson. 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987). 
Later, in Illinois v. Lafayette. 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610 (1983), the Supreme Court held 
that it is not "unreasonable" for police, as part of the routine procedure incident to 
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his or her 
possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures. 
Therefore, if this Court finds that defendant's planner was not properly seized 
incident to his arrest, it can nevertheless conclude that it would have been found during 
an inventory search conducted in accordance with established procedures. See Nix v. 
Williams. 104 S. Ct. 2501, 2509 (1984) (the inevitable discovery rule allows the 
admission of evidence "if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the 




This Court should uphold the trial court's ruling and affirm. 
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RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 971400044 
DATE: JULY 15, 1997 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
CLERK: SGJ 
Chad Staten is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine with Intent to 
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a First Degree Felony; Possession of Marijuana with Intent to 
Distribute in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony; Possession of Paraphernalia in a 
Drug Free Zone, a Class A Misdemeanor; and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by 
Restricted Person, a Third Degree Felony. 
A preliminary hearing was conducted on May 23, 1997. The Court found that there 
was probable cause that the offenses were committed and that the defendant committed the 
offenses. 
The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on March 26, 1997, supported by a 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The State of Utah filed a Response to Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on May 5, 1997. 
A suppression hearing was conducted on May 9, 1997, and the defense sought leave 
to file a reply memorandum. A Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress was filed on June 4, 1997. The State of Utah filed a Request to Submit For 
Decision on June 12, 1997. This judge conducted both the preliminary hearing and 
suppression hearing. The defendant has relied upon a transcript of both hearings and the 
Court will rely upon the testimony in both hearings in this ruling. 
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FACTS 
"The factual findings of a trial court that underlie its decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Davis. 
821 P.2d 9, 11. The Court adopts, in part, the facts as set forth in the State's memorandum, 
subject to various significant clarifications made in the hearings. 
On December 22, 1996, officers in Provo, Utah were trying to locate Megan 
Kearley, a sixteen-year-old runaway. Officers received information that Megan might be at 
the Motel 6 in Provo on South University Avenue, and that she was thought to be staying 
with a male individual by the first name of Chad. The officer went to the front desk of the 
Motel 6 and described Megan and "Chad" to the person at the front desk. A teller or 
manager at the front desk indicated that they did have a young female fitting the description 
staying in a room (208 in the preliminary hearing; 263 in the suppression hearing) that was 
rented to a "Chad Staten." They gave the officers the driver's license number which was 
used as identification to rent the room. Dispatch confirmed the license number as Chad 
Staten's. The person at the front desk also said that they thought that Megan had called to 
the room from somewhere else a few minutes before. 
The officer then went across the street and called the room registered to Chad Staten 
and asked for Megan. The male individual who answered the phone said that Megan was not 
there but should be back soon. The male attempted to get the officer to give his name, and 
then there was some discussion in which the officer indicated that it was very important that 
he get in touch with Megan. The male indicated that he thought he knew what the officer 
needed and that he might be able to help him. The officer then asked the defendant if he had 
some "stuff" to which the defendant replied that he thought he knew what the officer needed 
and that the officer should call back in ten minutes. Officer Heniger testified that kids that 
have pagers that (the police) deal with usually have some ties with drugs. 
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The officer then began calling the narcotics officers and for back-up. Before the 
other officers arrived, a vehicle drove into the parking lot and a female fitting Megan's 
description got out of the vehicle and went into room 263. After waiting a few more minutes 
Officer Heniger called room 263 again and talked to Megan. She said that he should talk to 
"Chad" and handed the phone to him. Defendant told the officer that he could get him some 
"bitch." Officer Heniger testified that "bitch" is a street name for methamphetamine. The 
officer told defendant he would be right over. Megan was then observed leaving room 263 
and entering a vehicle. She was stopped and placed under arrest as a runaway, and she was 
taken into custody. 
Megan had in her possession a small zip-lock baggie of rock methamphetamine. 
She said that she had gotten it from the defendant in the motel room. When Megan was 
placed in custody she requested to be allowed to go up to the room where the defendant was, 
and on the terrace, balcony level of the second level she began to scream about two doors 
from the defendant's room. She continued to scream as the officers then took her back down 
the stairs and secured her. Officer Heniger believed the defendant could hear the screaming, 
and Megan was attempting to alert and warn the defendant that there was a problem. 
Next, the officer asked a friend of Megan's, Tim Hansen, to go with him to room 
263. Officer Heniger explained his reason for taking a civilian appearance as follows: 
The exact reason if he (Staten) saw a uniformed officer and he had already 
offered me narcotics over the phone and if he saw a uniformed officer he 
doesn't have to open up the door. He could just go and flush everything 
down the toilet. (Transcript, Suppression Hearing at 27) 
The officer was to the side where he could not be seen as the defendant opened the 
door. Once the door was opened, the officer stepped out facing the defendant. From this 
position outside the door, the officer could see baggies, a copper pipe and several boxes that 
said "scales" on them. The baggies were similar to the ones that the methamphetamine was 
in that was found on Megan's person. Tim Hansen pointed to the copper pipe and said, 
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"Look, there is a marijuana pipe.*' Defendant denied it was a marijuana pipe, and when the 
officer asked if the officer could come in to retrieve it, the defendant agreed. The defendant 
denied the officer's request to search the premises; he would not let them search without a 
warrant. 
The officer, from the doorway, and when he entered the room, was able to observe 
several items of paraphernalia in plain view; the copper butane nozzle which both he and the 
civilian thought looked like a marijuana pipe, baggies and a box marked "scales." The 
baggies were identical to the one produced by Megan; very small, an inch by inch baggie 
with a little zip-lock on top. When the officer retrieved the item which was actually copper 
tubing attached to a blow torch, he also noticed several butane torches and several butane 
tanks underneath the same nightstand/desk area. 
The defendant was then "taken into custody" in the room and handcuffed and asked 
to be seated in a chair near the foot of one of the beds. At this point Officer Heniger was the 
only officer in the room. Officer Heniger then made a very cursory search for weapons. 
A loaded, pistol grip, shotgun without a stock, was recovered within a few feet of 
the front door and within "lunge area" of the defendant. The weapon was secured. 
The facts now are muddled, but what is clear is that the officer waited about fifteen 
minutes for NET (Narcotics Enforcement Team) officers to arrive. NET officers 
"inventoried" the items in the room, finding several baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana, 
digital scales and additional shotgun shells. 
A NET officer asked the defendant for identification. The defendant said 
identification was in the planner. A planner had been recovered tucked between the 
mattresses one-half way between the headboard and the foot of the bed. The officer opened 
the planner to obtain the ID and located baggies of drugs and a set of small scales. 
There were no third persons in the motel room until Chad Staten was arrested. But 
there was no testimony whether a bathroom was separate from the sleeping room. 
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It is important to note that Officer Heniger is a new officer, with two years of 
experience. In addition, it is important to note that he is a patrolman. Next, it is important to 
note that the Motel 6 room is small, consisting of two beds, and the nightstand was about ten 
feet from the front door. 
n. 
THE LAW 
Consent to Search, Plain View and Exigent Grcumstance 
The defendant's argument that he did not give consent to enter the room is 
misplaced. Evidence was in plain view from the doorway. Expectations of privacy do not 
extend to evidence which is in plain view. In addition, there was ample probable cause to 
effectuate an arrest of the defendant, and the officer could have entered the room for that 
purpose without consent or invitation by the defendant 
Even prior to the officer approaching the defendant's room, the officer had already 
engaged the defendant in a conversation, by phone in which Megan identified the person the 
officer was speaking to as Chad and the individual identified agreed to sell the officer 
controlled substances. At that point the defendant had already arguably committed the crime 
of agreeing to sell controlled substances which gave the officer probable cause for arrest and 
to search for the substances. It was not unreasonable for the officer to assume that there were 
controlled substances in the room since defendant had just agreed to sell him some from the 
room, and Megan had indicated that she had gotten the substances from the defendant in 
room 263. Arguably he had sold or supplied drugs to Megan, a minor, and may have 
harbored a runaway juvenile. Drug paraphernalia was viewed from the doorway and the 
officer had probable cause to arrest him for this offense. 
In the recent case of State v. Well. 304 Utah Advance Reports 6 (November 21, 
1996) the Court of Appeals of Utah stated the basis for determining exigent circumstances. 
The Court stated, 
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Utah courts have identified several exigent circumstances that may justify a 
warrantless search, including the immediate need to prevent harm to the 
officers, destruction of evidence, or escape of the subject. Wells at 8. 
(Citations omitted). 
At least initially, all of the above factors are possible in this case given the fact that 
Megan was attempting to warn the defendant and that the defendant already had reason to be 
suspicious given the phone calls made by the officer and the fact that he was dealing drugs. 
The co-defendant was already under arrest and was attempting to warn the 
defendant. Had officers waited to obtain a warrant, it is likely the defendant may have left or 
the evidence destroyed, secreted or dissipated. 
The Wells court further sets forth the standard as follows: 
As is the standard in all search and seizure cases, whether a search is 
reasonable under the incident-to-arrest exception depends on the particular 
facts of each case. See State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853 855 (Utah 1978). 
Under this exception, an officer may search the area within the arrestee's 
"immediate control" to prevent the arrestee from obtaining weapons or 
destroying evidence. Chi me I v, California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 766, 89 S. 
Ct. 2034, 2040-41, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685 (1969); Austin, 584 P.2d at 855; State 
v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 784 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 
(Utah 1991). 
The pistol grip, fully loaded, shotgun was recovered within a few feet of the 
defendant. The gun was within the immediate control of the defendant and was properly and 
constitutionally seized. 
Beyond the seizure of the pistol grip shotgun, the court must determine whether a 
further search was allowed under an exigent circumstance or search incident to arrest theory. 
Utah courts have focused on the totality of the factual circumstances to determine if the area 
searched was within the arrestee's immediate control. 
As set forth in Utah v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853, a defendant who is in custody need 
not be physically able to move about in order to justify a search within a limited area once an 
arrest has been made. 
6 
• j _ 0069 
While handcuffed, this defendant was not further restrained and he could, if he 
chose, to physically move around this small room. Police restraint is not dispositive of 
"immediate control/* 
State v. Austin. 584 P.2d 853, also stands for the proposition that there are inherent 
differences an arrest at a hotel creates; evidence could inadvertently be removed or destroyed 
by hotel cleaning maids. This motel room is very small and defendant, prior to and past 
constraint, had easy access to the searched area. He was within four feet of the planner, for 
example. 
Finally, the State fails to produce sufficient evidence regarding the motel room 
layout; were there two rooms (a living space and a bathroom) or only one room? If there was 
a separate bathroom, how easily could the defendant gain access to that room? Were items of 
evidence discovered in the bathroom? 
There is no evidence regarding the location of several items which were seized; the 
pager; cellular phone and video tapes. The Court, absent testimony regarding location, cannot 
determine whether the item was within the defendant's "immediate control." Most of the 
evidence comes in under a plain view exception, an exigent circumstance exception, or search 
incident to arrest. But the State has failed to carry its burden as to some evidence. 
Item Seized Suppressed Legal & Constitutional 
testification to Allow 
Evidence 
1. Pistol Grip, loaded 12 No Exigent circumstance, 
guage shotgun, without plain view and search 
stock incident to arrest 
2. Butane torch, No Plain view as 
copper/brass attachments, paraphernalia 
cans of butane 
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3. Box of scales No Plain view and search 
incident to arrest within 
suspect's control 
4. Baggies, and baggies 
in shaving kit 
No Plain view as 
paraphernalia and search 
incident to arrest within 
suspects* control 
5. Ice Scraper* 
6. Shotgun shells 





Search incident to arrest 
within suspect's control 
In plain view on 
nightstand and search 
incident to arrest within 
suspect's control 
Search incident to arrest 
within suspect's control 
8. False video tapes 
9. Pager 




Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
Insufficient testimony as 
to location to determine if 
within suspect's control 
The search incident to arrest was "properly confined to a limited area within the 
*See testimony regarding ice scraper that alerted officers that it contained drugs. 
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suspect's control." The search was limited to an area from within which he might gain 
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Chimel v. California 
m. 
RULING 
Based upon the above facts and the applicable law, defendant's motion is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
Counsel for defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this /£ day of July, 1997. 
COURT 
cc: Sherry Ragan, Esq. 
Randy Spencer, Esq. 
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